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OPINION 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
 Ralph Dennis seeks a new trial, asserting that the 
District Court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury 
on an entrapment defense and by denying his motion for 
dismissal asserting outrageous prosecution.  He also contends 
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that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.  Dennis was convicted of 
conspiracy to rob a narcotics “stash house,” pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 1951(a), 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1),  and 21 U.S.C. 
§841(b)(1)(A).  He was also convicted of carrying a firearm 
during the commission of the crime, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(1)(A)(i).  The District Court sentenced Dennis to 180 
months’ imprisonment, the statutory minimum.   
 
 Dennis maintains that Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) agents induced him, through 
a friend, to participate in a reverse sting that was designed to 
incriminate him and co-conspirators.1  We agree that the 
District Court should have given an entrapment instruction on 
the robbery and gun possession charges.  Therefore, we will 
vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence as to these 
charges and remand for a new trial.  The judgment is affirmed 
on the remaining drug charge.   
II.2 
                                              
1 Dennis was tried with Terrance Hardee who was convicted 
for his role in the “stash house” robbery.  The United States 
separately appealed Hardee’s 92-month sentence, Hardee did 
not appeal or cross-appeal.  We remanded for resentencing in 
that case for reasons that do not change our analysis here.  
Another conspirator, John Mitchell, pleaded guilty and 
received a 78-month sentence.    
 
2 For purposes of our review of Dennis’ appeal of the District 
Court’s denial of his request for an entrapment instruction, we 
will resolve all factual conflicts in favor of Dennis “no matter 
how improbable we may find the defense version of the 
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 In June 2012, ATF agents in Camden, New Jersey met 
with Kevin Burk, a convicted felon facing forgery charges 
who had been cooperating with local law enforcement as a 
confidential informant.  The agents were investigating a string 
of robberies in Southern New Jersey and Philadelphia 
County, Pennsylvania.  Upon being questioned about 
associates who were involved in robberies or violent crimes, 
Burk responded that Dennis had spoken of conducting home 
invasions and other robberies.  The ATF agents were unaware 
of Dennis prior to this.  Burk added that Dennis recently had 
been detained at the Camden County Jail.  
  
 The agents confirmed Dennis’ detention and then 
conducted a criminal record search.  They discovered that 
Dennis had several felony convictions for possession with 
intent to distribute small amounts of crack cocaine between 
1996 and 1998, burglary of a motor bike in 2003, and for 
possessing with intent to sell multiple pounds of marijuana in 
2011.  Burk then told agents that Dennis had previously 
requested his help in robbing a check-cashing operation, but 
he had declined. Dennis later testified that this was false.  J.A. 
1040. 3 
 
                                                                                                     
facts.”  United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir. 
1973). 
 
3
 Dennis testified that it was Burk who had requested Dennis’ 
help in these robberies.  Dennis testified that he declined three 
prior invitations.  Burk’s brother later corroborated one of the 
incidents that Dennis alleged with eye-witness testimony.  For 
purposes of our review, we accept Dennis’ version of these 
interactions. 
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 ATF agents instructed Burk to ask Dennis for his help, 
supplying Burk with a fictional back-story:  he was to tell 
Dennis that he needed his help to carry out a robbery.  Dennis 
and Burk were friends, and each was acquainted with the 
other’s family members.  J.A. 1002-03.  Together they 
engaged in small quantity cocaine purchases and sales.  
Additionally, after Burk served a sentence for his drug 
activities, he and Dennis became involved in pound-quantity 
marijuana sales, traveling to Texas together on more than one 
occasion to purchase a supply of marijuana.  J.A. 1009.  
Dennis was arrested for this activity.   He testified that, after 
this, he attempted to break free of a life of crime, but admits 
he still purchased small quantities of cocaine for Burk.  
Eventually, Dennis violated parole and was incarcerated for 
60 days in the Camden County jail.  
   
 Burk tried, on a number of occasions, to enlist Dennis’ 
help in various robbery schemes.  Dennis said that, three 
times, Burk asked for his help to carry out bank robberies.  
He declined each time.  J.A. 1017-21.  On Burk’s third 
attempt, Dennis recalls that Burk told him he already had the 
guns and the scanner needed for the job.  J.A. 1022.  Dennis 
says that he refused to help Burk.  Two weeks later, Burk 
approached him to ask for his help in robbing a stash house.  
This time, Burk told him that the job was necessary to help 
out his mother who had cancer.  Burk told him that “Rock,” a 
disgruntled drug courier for a Mexican drug cartel, was the 
point person for the job.  Burk said that the robbery would 
yield 30 to 40 kilograms of cocaine with a street-value of $2 
million.  J.A. 1027-28.  Dennis agreed.  This was the 
beginning of the ATF’s reverse sting operation. 
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 During the discussion between Burk and Dennis about 
the stash house robbery, John Mitchell (an acquaintance of 
Dennis) drove by.  He questioned Dennis about his meeting 
with Burk.  J.A. 1029.  Later, Dennis told Mitchell about the 
plan, asked him to help, and introduced him to Burk.  
Mitchell agreed to assist.4  Dennis portrayed Mitchell as 
someone who “robbed . . . young bulls in the neighborhood” 
and as someone who often carried a gun.  J.A. 1055.   
 
 Burk set up the first meeting between the ATF agent, 
Dennis and Mitchell for June 21, 2012.  Before the meeting, 
Burk told Dennis and Mitchell that they needed to impress 
Rock because he was “the real thing.”  J.A. 1029.  Burk asked 
them to “play the role” to impress Rock so that they could get 
the job.  J.A. 1030.  Dennis said that he and Mitchell 
complied.   
 
 The ATF agent posing as Rock (Greg Sheridan) met 
with Burk, Dennis, and Mitchell in Pennsauken, New Jersey, 
and provided more details about the job.5  Rock explained 
that he was seeking revenge because the cartel refused to loan 
him money to help his ailing mother.  Rock went on to 
explain his role as courier, and he shared his observations of 
how the cartel’s stash houses operated.  Dennis and Mitchell 
both asked questions on details about how the stash house 
                                              
4 Mitchell testified that Dennis met him at a bar and told him 
about Burk’s plan to rob a stash house.  
 
5 Most meetings were recorded with audio and video.  The 
narrative of these meetings in this opinion is drawn both from 
trial testimony and from the transcript of the recording shown 
to jury.   
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would be guarded.  Dennis expressed concern about 
retribution directed at Rock, and indicated that the plan had to 
insulate Rock from any suspicion of being involved.  
J.A.1323-24.   Rock also stressed that they had to have a well-
executed plan because the stakes were high.  J.A. 1311-12.  
Dennis initially stated that they would have to put the guards 
down, and that they would “fold” when he put a gun in the 
mouth of one of the guards.  J.A. 1032, 1312.  Later in the 
meeting he suggested they only subdue and tie up the guards.  
J.A. 1035.  Dennis also told Rock that they would bring a .40 
caliber gun and a .357 magnum gun.  Nonetheless, he testified 
that he felt he was in over his head, though he did not show 
this to Rock.  J.A. 1035.  He said that he was saying these 
things solely to impress Rock, and to probe his intent.  J.A. 
1033, 1035, 1037.  Dennis testified that he did not own a gun.  
He last had a gun when he was fifteen years old.  He 
explained that the reason for this was that he “wasn’t trying to 
go that route, like whatsoever, as far as hurting somebody or 
somebody hurting me or anything.  So, I just got rid of [the 
gun].”  J.A. 1013-14.   
 
 Rock offered Mitchell and Dennis a chance to back 
out.  Both declined this opportunity.  Burk said that they 
needed another meeting to figure out whether Rock was law 
enforcement.  J.A. 1039.   However, he also told Dennis that 
Rock had been a good friend ten years earlier and that he was 
“the real deal.”  J.A. 1041.  Dennis suggested that they 
needed another man to be part of this plan to have someone 
who was physically intimidating enough to handle the guards.  
J.A.1041-42.  This man was Terrance Hardee.   
 
 During two later meetings, on June 27, 2012 and on 
July 10, 2012, the group discussed their plan.  Rock again 
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expressed his feeling of betrayal toward the cartel for its 
refusal to help him.  He told the group that there were usually 
between 15 and 20 kilograms of cocaine at the stash house, 
and that it was guarded by two individuals, one being armed.  
The conversation moved on to how they would be 
compensated for the job.  Rock cautioned them that they 
would need to repackage the cocaine they received from the 
heist to avoid being tracked by the cartel.  Dennis responded 
that he had already thought of that, and planned to split the 
kilogram packages of cocaine and re-wrap them.  J.A. 466-67. 
  
 As for the robbery, Rock told the group that he 
received only general information one day in advance about 
the stash house location.  He suggested that Mitchell could 
hide in the back of his SUV as they approached the stash 
house and characterized the proposed robbery as relatively 
easy because the stash house guards were “slippin a little bit.”  
J.A. 1366.  Dennis suggested that they would use stun guns to 
subdue the guards.  During the meeting, Mitchell appeared to 
assume that Dennis would accompany him into the stash 
house, but Dennis made it clear that he would stay parked 
outside, and send in someone who was bigger and more 
threatening.  He told the group he would be listening on a cell 
phone.   J.A. 1375-77.  
  
 Mitchell requested a third meeting to get clarity on the 
specific roles each one would play in the robbery and how 
they would approach the stash house.  Burk called Rock to set 
it up.  At that July 10, 2012 meeting, they talked through how 
Rock, Mitchell, and a third man (Hardee) would enter.  
Mitchell and Dennis agreed that those who entered the stash 
house behind Rock should present themselves as DEA agents 
and subdue with stun guns and zip ties both the armed guard 
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at the door and the unarmed guard watching over the cocaine 
bricks in the kitchen.  Dennis stated that their objective was to 
get in and out quickly with “nobody gettin’ hurt.”  J.A. 1400.   
He also suggested that he take Rock’s truck after the robbery 
to strengthen the perception that Rock was not involved in it.  
Dennis testified that he was very nervous at this point and 
wrestled with whether he wished to follow through on the job.  
J.A. 1057.  
 
 After the July 10, 2012 meeting, Burk reminded 
Dennis that he told the group he had two guns he would 
bring.  J.A. 1063.  Dennis questioned whether another gun 
was needed, since Hardee was going to go into the stash 
house with a stun gun.  Burk pressed that it was necessary for 
Dennis to have a gun in his role as lookout.  J.A. 1065.  The 
next day, Burk stopped by again and gave Dennis a red bag 
containing a gun.  He asked Dennis to keep the bag at his 
residence.  J.A. 1066.  Dennis testified that this was one of 
the guns found when they were arrested.  J.A. 1067.  A 
second gun found at that time belonged to Mitchell.   
 Dennis received a message on July 15, 2012, that the 
robbery would take place on the next day.  Dennis and 
Mitchell purchased zip ties but did not purchase DEA shirts 
as planned.  J.A. 609.  Dennis, Mitchell, and Hardee met that 
evening to discuss the plans for the robbery.  The next 
morning, the group departed for Cherry Hill, New Jersey, in 
Burk’s vehicle.  At that point, they were in possession of two 
guns, one stun gun, gloves, and zip ties.  Once in Cherry Hill, 
the group traveled in two cars to a storage facility to prepare 
for and rehearse the robbery.  Once there, Rock told the group 
that they could leave his share of the cocaine in the storage 
unit. He gave the gate code to enter the storage facility to 
Mitchell.  Rock talked through the details of how the stash 
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house is set up.  The group then walked through the robbery, 
rehearsing how it would unfold.  After they completed this 
walk-through, ATF agents rushed in on the group and 
arrested Dennis, Mitchell, and Hardee.   
 
 Mitchell pleaded guilty.  Hardee and Dennis were tried 
together.  Dennis first moved to have the indictment 
dismissed on the basis of outrageous prosecution.  The 
District Court ruled that it could not “find anything inherently 
outrageous or unfair or something that shocks [the] 
conscience.”  J.A. 42.  The District Court left open, however, 
the possibility of revisiting the motion if evidence at trial 
warranted.  It never did so.    
 
 Dennis then proceeded with an entrapment defense.  
Dennis testified on his own behalf and called two other 
witnesses:  Dr. Carol Armstrong and Seth Lawrenson.  Dr. 
Armstrong, a neuropsychologist who examined Dennis, 
concluded that he suffers from neurocognitive impairments, 
with an IQ score of 74.  She testified that Dennis was 
impaired in “[h]is ability to correct his thinking, his ability to 
reason or . . . to infer what the consequences are of a thought 
that he has.”  J.A. 890.  She responded in the affirmative 
when asked:  “Do you believe that Ralph Dennis was more 
susceptible to influence than otherwise healthy individuals 
would be in this case?”  J.A. 889.  Lawrenson, Burk’s 
brother, testified to witnessing, on one occasion, Dennis 
decline Burk’s request to help him rob a bank.  
 
 After the defense rested, the District Court considered 
Dennis’ request for a jury charge on entrapment.  The District 
Court concluded that Dennis’ own testimony established a 
predilection to commit crimes with Burk as demonstrated by 
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his long association with him and the number of crimes the 
two committed together.  It also ruled that the record provided 
no evidence that Dennis was hesitant to join in the 
conspiracy.  J.A. 99-100.  The District Court said that any 
inference drawn from his refusal to participate in previous 
crimes with Burk could “cut both ways,” and could show that 
Dennis was fully capable of choosing what criminal activity 
he wanted to engage in.  J.A. 102.   Moreover, the District 
Court ruled that his words and actions showed a ready 
willingness to become involved.  This conclusion was 
strengthened by his recruiting of Hardee to help carry out the 
robbery.  J.A. 97.  Finally, Dennis’ resolve to participate was 
demonstrated by his refusal to sever himself from the group 
after the ATF undercover agent explicitly gave him an 
opportunity to leave.  In the District Court’s assessment, all of 
this evidence was “overwhelming” compared to the “small” 
evidence Dennis proffered in his testimony:  stating that he 
was a reluctant participant, that he had not owned a gun, and 
that the use of Burk’s mother in persuading him to join the 
conspiracy weighed heavily on his decision.  J.A. 99.   
III. 
Entrapment 
 Dennis first argues that he is entitled to a new trial 
because the District Court erred by denying his request for a 
jury instruction on entrapment.  We give plenary review to a 
District Court’s denial of a motion for a jury charge of 
entrapment.  United States v. Fedroff, 874 F.2d 178, 182 (3d 
Cir. 1989).  “Entrapment occurs when a defendant who was 
not predisposed to commit the crime does so as a result of the 
government’s inducement.”  United States v. Jannotti, 673 
F.2d 578, 597 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (“Jannotti I ”), cert. denied, 
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457 U.S. 1106 (1982).  There are two elements of proof:  
inducement by the government to commit the crime, and the 
defendant’s lack of predisposition to commit the crime.  
United States v. Wright, 921 F.2d 42, 44 (3d Cir. 1990).  A 
defendant who requests the District Court to instruct the jury 
on an entrapment defense has a “burden of production” with 
regard to both elements.  United States v. El-Gawli, 837 F.2d 
142, 145 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
 The defendant must first produce enough evidence to 
show inducement by the government.  A “mere solicitation” 
or request by the government to participate in a criminal 
activity, without more, is not inducement.  Wright, 921 F.2d 
at 45.  Likewise, merely opening an opportunity for a crime is 
insufficient.  Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 66 
(1988).  Rather, the defendant must show that law 
enforcement engaged in conduct that takes the form of 
‘“persuasion, fraudulent representation, threats, coercive 
tactics, harassment, promises of reward or pleas based on 
need, sympathy or friendship.’”  Wright, 921 F.2d. at 45 
(quoting Fedroff, 874 F.2d at 184).  
  
 The District Court noted that this was a reverse sting 
operation, and it appeared to agree with Dennis that the 
inducement prong of the analysis had thus been met.  We too 
are convinced that the first prong of the analysis has been 
met, but we are not so quick to conclude that it is simply 
because it was a reverse sting.  Rather, there were a number 
of elements of this particular operation that lead us to 
conclude that Dennis met his burden to raise a question about 
inducement.   
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 A major factor in our conclusion is the central role that 
Burk, the ATF’s confidential informant, played in getting 
Dennis to participate in the scheme.  Dennis had no known 
connections to the crimes the ATF was investigating at that 
time and was only targeted after Burk produced Dennis’ name 
in response to the ATF’s general inquiry about people he 
knew who were involved in robberies.  Moreover, Burk’s 
personal relationship to Dennis contributed to the operation 
by allowing Burk to appeal to Dennis’ sympathies based on 
the story of Burk’s sick mother whom Dennis had met on a 
number of occasions.6  We also note that Burk:  recruited 
                                              
6 The Government argues that Dennis never explicitly said 
that Burk’s friendship, nor the story of Burk’s ailing mother, 
influenced his decision.  We disagree. On cross examination, 
Dennis was asked if anything other than personal risks and 
rewards motivated his involvement in the robbery. J.A. 1138.  
He responded that there was more to why he agreed to join 
the scheme. Id. The prosecutor immediately followed up by 
asking why he never said anything along the lines of “gee, 
[Burk], this is really gonna help your mother.” Id.  Dennis 
responded that he had done so, but his statements were not 
caught on the ATF’s recordings and that many of his 
conversations with Burk took place outside the presence of 
ATF agents and their equipment. J.A. 1138–39.  This 
exchange indicates that Burk’s plea affected Dennis’ decision 
to join the scheme. And this is unsurprising—a friend whom 
he had known for years asked for help to pay for his mother’s 
cancer treatment.  While it is true that Dennis never uttered 
the words that “friendship motivated his participation” in the 
stash house scheme, we find a plea of friendship to lie at the 
basis of Burk’s plea for help. Indeed, the entirety of Burk and 
Dennis’ conversation seems predicated on friendship. This 
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Dennis, set up the first meeting with the ATF agent, drove 
Dennis to the meeting, and asked that Dennis “play the role” 
of a seasoned robber.7   
 Each of Burk’s assists, by themselves, would not 
necessarily be enough to tip the scales to constitute 
inducement.  However, collectively, they carry great weight.  
When this is added to the substantial financial payoff that was 
pitched to Dennis ($1.5 million to $2 million), we are 
convinced that the Government’s efforts properly can be 
classified as inducement.  The Government’s action exceeded 
a situation in which it merely opened up an opportunity for 
committing a crime.8  Here, the Government targeted an 
                                                                                                     
view is only strengthened by the fact that we are required to 
interpret the record in a manner favorable to Dennis.  
Additionally, Dennis’ testimony about all of Burk’s appeals 
to him to assist in various schemes is consistent with the 
proposition that their friendship played a role.  See  J.A. 
1017- 22 (describing the nature of Burk’s unsuccessful 
appeals for his help in robbery schemes); J.A. 1022- 27 
(describing the nature of Burk’s successful appeal for help 
with the stash house scheme). 
 
7 Later, Burk convinced Dennis of the need for Dennis to 
have a gun during the robbery, and then he supplied the gun 
to Dennis.  This evidence, though occurring well after Dennis 
was induced, is relevant to the charge for gun possession. 
 
8The Government’s actions “exceeded the typical sting in 
which the government merely offers an ordinary opportunity 
to commit a crime, without more.” United States v. Blitch, 
773 F.3d 837, 845 (7th Cir. 2014), as amended on denial of 
reh’g and reh’g en banc (Jan. 27, 2015), cert. denied sub 
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individual previously unknown to it and, with the help and 
persuasion of an informant who was a friend of the target, 
actively led him into the commission of a crime.  This 
satisfies Dennis’ burden on inducement.  
 
 We next examine whether there was sufficient 
evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about Dennis’ 
predisposition to commit the crime.  United States v. Jannotti, 
729 F.2d 213, 225 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Jannotti II”); United 
States v. Bocra, 623 F.2d 281, 285 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 875 (1980) (“[K]ey to the successful establishment of an 
entrapment defense is proof that the defendant was not 
predisposed to commit the crime and that the criminal intent 
in fact originated with the Government.”).  “The basic 
question in an alleged entrapment case is whether the accused 
was ready and willing to commit the crime if any opportunity 
should be presented, or whether a person not otherwise 
disposed to wrongdoing was corrupted by some overreaching 
or special inducement, often amounting to reprehensible 
conduct.”  Watson, 489 F.2d at 509.  “In general, 
predisposition may be defined as the defendant’s inclination 
to engage in the crime for which he was charged, measured 
before his initial exposure to government agents.”   Fedroff, 
874 F.2d at 182 (citations and footnote omitted).  
  
 Dennis argues that the record contained more than 
sufficient evidence to meet his burden of showing that he 
lacked a predisposition to commit this crime.  He focuses on 
                                                                                                     
nom. Carwell v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2371 (2015) 
(quoting United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417, 434 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (en banc)). 
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the following facts:  the absence of robbery or violent crimes 
in his criminal history; his partially corroborated testimony of 
turning away three prior opportunities to join Burk in 
robberies; his disavowal of violence on the stand; his 
testimony that he has not owned a gun in many years; and the 
expert testimony of his vulnerability to being persuaded due 
to his low IQ.   
 
 Even with all of this evidence, the District Court still 
concluded that he did not produce enough evidence to ground 
a jury instruction on entrapment, stating that there is “almost 
no evidence of an absence of predilection and overwhelming 
evidence of a predisposition or predilection to commit the 
crime.” J.A. 101.  The District Court was convinced that the 
recordings of the meetings between Dennis and the others 
showed him to be an “eager participant” despite testimony 
that Dennis was told to “play the role” to impress Rock.  J.A. 
100, 1030.  The District Court regarded Dennis’ long 
association with Burk in previous drug crimes as strong 
evidence of predilection.  It also recognized that Dennis had, 
on three previous occasions, declined to join Burk in robbery 
plans.  It acknowledged that a positive inference could be 
drawn from this information, giving significance to Burk’s 
use of an ailing mother as an important factor in Dennis’ 
decision to accept Burk’s solicitation in this case.  However, 
the District Court reasoned that this inference could “cut both 
ways” and that the stronger inference from this testimony was 
that Dennis felt free to accept or decline Burk’s solicitations 
at will.  J.A. 102. 
 
 Dennis says that the District Court erred by weighing 
this evidence and by drawing inferences against him.  He 
goes on to assert that these defects in the District Court’s 
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deliberation of his motion for an entrapment instruction 
pertain to all of the counts on which he was convicted since 
the drug conviction was inextricably entwined with the 
robbery conspiracy. 
 
 The Government suggests that the favorable review 
standard that Dennis applies is proper only for motions 
considered pretrial.  Citing to Marino, it contends that, since 
Dennis was permitted to present his evidence in support of an 
entrapment defense, the District Court was permitted to weigh 
the evidence to decide Dennis’ motion.  United States v. 
Marino, 868 F.2d 549, 554 (3d Cir. 1989).  However, Marino 
is distinguished because it was focused on the need for a 
separate evidentiary hearing.  It held that a separate hearing 
was not necessary to rule on the entrapment motion because 
all of the defendant’s evidence relevant to entrapment was 
presented at trial, and it was insufficient to justify an 
instruction.   Id.  The timing of the motion does not alter the 
necessity of the District Court to refrain from invading the 
province of the jury.  Here, it was not for the District Court to 
decide the evidence “cut both ways” and draw a conclusion 
against Dennis.  Similarly, it was impermissible for the Court 
to credit the Government’s evidence when Dennis presented 
evidence to the contrary.  Therefore, we conclude that the 
District Court did err by weighing evidence and by 
improperly drawing inferences against Dennis on the robbery 
and firearm charges.  However, as we will explain further 
below, there is no such error as to Dennis’ conviction on the 
drug conspiracy charge.  
 
 The Government argues in the alternative that, even if 
the District Court did commit such errors, Dennis is not 
entitled to a new trial because the errors were harmless.  It 
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notes that—in spite of the District Court’s denial of his 
motion for an instruction—Dennis was still able to proffer all 
of his evidence on entrapment.  Therefore, even though the 
District Court may have erred in its deliberation of evidence 
supporting the motion, our harmless error review—like the 
jury’s—encompasses the entire record.  As a result, it asserts, 
the District Court’s review of the entire record is ultimately 
excusable because the jury was able to weigh all of the 
evidence and it still convicted Dennis on the strength of the 
evidence the Government presented.   
 
  “Unless the appellate court believes it highly probable 
that the error did not affect the judgment, it should reverse.”  
Government of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d 
Cir. 1974);  Jannotti II, 729 F.2d at 225.  As the Government 
acknowledges, if Dennis’ motion for an entrapment 
instruction had been granted, “the government [would have] 
had the entire burden of disproving entrapment beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”   El-Gawli, 837 F.2d at 146.  Therefore, 
although it is true that the jury was able to weigh all of the 
evidence—including Dennis’ entrapment evidence—it did so 
without considering whether the Government carried its 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not 
entrap Dennis to commit the crimes of conspiracy to commit 
robbery and gun possession.  Given that we have already 
ruled that Dennis presented sufficient evidence to create 
reasonable doubt about inducement and his predisposition to 
commit these crimes, we cannot conclude that it is highly 
probable that the District Court’s error did not affect the 
judgment as to these crimes. 
 
 Nonetheless, Dennis’ reliance on his criminal record to 
make his case for a lack of predisposition for committing 
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robbery and possessing a gun does not help him show that he 
was not predisposed to commit drug crimes.  His history of 
convictions for possession and distribution of cocaine and 
marijuana contradicts Dennis’ assertion that he was not 
predisposed to commit the crime of possessing and 
distributing cocaine.  Dennis’ attempt to distinguish his 
record of dealing in small quantities of cocaine from the large 
quantity of cocaine at issue here is unavailing.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Blitch, 773 F.3d 837, 845 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(finding that a prior conviction for delivering nine grams of 
cocaine “demonstrate[d] that [the defendant] was predisposed 
to join a drug trafficking conspiracy” that dealt in kilogram 
quantities of cocaine), as amended on denial of reh’g and 
reh’g en banc (Jan. 27, 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Carwell 
v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2371 (2015).  Similarly, we are 
not convinced that his marijuana conviction has little 
relevance because this case involved cocaine—both involve 
the distribution of large quantities of illegal drugs. See United 
States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 945–46 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(stating that evidence of trafficking cocaine was relevant for 
determining whether the defendant was predisposed to 
distribute heroin); United States v. Simtob, 901 F.23d 799, 
807 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Where entrapment is in issue . . . prior 
drug offenses [can be relevant] if the earlier conviction tends 
to prove that defendant was engaged in illegal operations in 
some way similar to those charged in the indictment, even if 
the drugs involved may be different.”).  Putting all of this 
evidence together leads us to conclude Dennis had a 
predisposition to distribute kilograms of cocaine.   
 
 Finally, we are not persuaded by Dennis’ suggestion 
that the drug conviction should be reversed solely because it 
is entwined with the robbery and firearm convictions.  As we 
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have previously discussed, a defendant must produce 
evidence that he lacked the predisposition to commit the 
crime for which he is charged to receive an entrapment 
instruction.  The fact that a defendant is charged with multiple 
counts arising from the same course of conduct does not 
vitiate the burden to do so for each count for which the 
defendant seeks an instruction.  As the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals persuasively reasoned when faced with a similar 
question:  
[E]ven if the counts charged in the 
Indictment formed part of the 
same course of conduct, and even 
if [the defendant was] induced as 
to all counts, there is still the 
question of whether [he was] 
predisposed to commit each of the 
crimes at issue. Because of the 
subjective, fact-intensive nature of 
the predisposition inquiry, it may 
well be that the facts of a given 
case indicate that an individual 
defendant is predisposed to 
commit some crimes, but not 
others. 
 
United States v. Isnadin, 742 F.3d 1278, 1302 (11th Cir. 
2014) (upholding an instruction that allowed a jury to 
evaluate entrapment on a count by count basis); see also 
United States v. Millet, 510 F.3d 668, 674–78 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(upholding a district court’s decision to instruct the jury on 
entrapment related to a gun charge, while refusing an 
entrapment instruction pertaining to related drug charges), as 
amended on denial of reh’g en banc (June 27, 2008).  Here, 
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Dennis failed to show a lack of predisposition for his drug 
conviction, but was successful in doing so for his conspiracy 
to commit robbery and firearm possession convictions.  Thus, 
he was entitled to an entrapment instruction as to the latter, 
but not the former.  As each conviction exists independently; 
so, too, must the justifications for an accompanying 
entrapment instruction. 
 
IV. 
Outrageous Prosecution 
 Dennis contends not only that he is deserving of a new 
trial, he also asserts that the indictment against him should be 
dismissed on the basis of an outrageous prosecution that 
violated his constitutional right to due process.9  The 
evidentiary burden is exceedingly great, requiring the 
defendant to show that the government essentially “created 
the crime for the sole purpose of obtaining a conviction.”  
United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 759-60 (3d Cir. 1999).   
Accordingly, dismissal under this circumstance is rare, 
occurring only where the government’s conduct is “shocking, 
outrageous, and clearly intolerable.”  United States v. Nolan-
Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 231 (3d Cir. 1998).   This 
constitutional claim “should be accepted by a court only to 
‘curb the most intolerable government conduct.’”  United 
States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11, 12 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting 
Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 608). 
                                              
9 We review the District Court’s factual findings for clear 
error, and give plenary review to its legal conclusions.  
United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 572 (3d Cir. 2010).   
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 Much of Dennis’ argument supporting his assertion of 
outrageous prosecution reiterates claims he made in the 
context of his appeal regarding entrapment. 10  Dennis 
contends that the Government created the crimes; that it had 
no credible basis for asserting that he was supporting himself 
and his family with criminal activity, nor any basis for 
suspecting Dennis would participate in the crimes; that the 
Government actively encouraged Dennis to participate in the 
crimes; and finally, that it provided the necessary information 
and implements for the crime.  However, “a successful due 
process defense must be predicated on intolerable government 
conduct which goes beyond that necessary to sustain an 
entrapment defense.”  Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 607.  Dennis must 
do more than merely show enough to convince a judge that a 
reasonable juror could doubt his predisposition or intent to 
commit the crime. 
 
 We dismissed a claim of outrageous prosecution in 
Beverly even though the entrapment defense was raised and 
instructed.  Beverly, 723 F.2d at 12-13.  Similar to the instant 
case (if we accept Dennis’ testimony as true), the ATF agent 
in Beverly: induced a person introduced by an informant to 
                                              
10 Dennis argues for the first time on appeal that the 
Government structured the crime to maximize Dennis’ 
punishment, and that the ATF’s reverse sting operations 
disproportionately target men of color, like Dennis.  We are 
not persuaded by Dennis that good cause exists for us to 
exercise our discretion to review them or, alternatively, to 
remand the issue to the District Court for further fact finding.  
The record provides no indicia of an outrageous abuse of the 
Government’s prosecutorial authority here.   
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commit a crime, supplied him with items necessary to carry it 
out, and transported him to the location where the crime was 
to be committed.  Id.   In our dismissal, we noted the Supreme 
Court’s admonishment to refrain from exercising ‘“a 
Chancellor’s foot’ veto over law enforcement practices of 
which it [does] not approve.’”  Id. at 13 (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973)).  
The same rationale applies here.11   
 
 
 
V. 
Conclusion 
 For all of the reasons stated above, we will reverse the 
judgment of conviction and sentence only on Count I, 
conspiracy to commit robbery pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
1951(a),  and Count III, using and carrying a firearm during 
and in relation to a crime of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(1)(A)(i). We will remand to the District Court for a 
new trial.  The judgment of conviction and sentence is 
affirmed on Count II, conspiracy to distribute and possess 
with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(A). 
                                              
11 Because we are reversing and remanding for a new trial on 
the robbery and firearm counts of the indictment, we will not 
address Dennis’ remaining claim that his sentence of fifteen 
years violated the Eighth Amendment.   
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and concurring in 
part 
 Offered the chance to participate in a stash house 
robbery, Ralph Dennis agreed without hesitation. This case is 
thus a straightforward application of the Supreme Court’s rule 
that a defendant is not entitled to an entrapment instruction 
when the evidence shows, at most, that the Government 
“merely afforded an opportunity or facilities for the 
commission of the crime.” Mathews v. United States, 485 
U.S. 58, 66 (1988). Despite Dennis’ eager participation, the 
majority concludes that the District Court was required to 
instruct the jury on entrapment. Because I believe that 
conclusion fails to follow Mathews, I respectfully dissent 
from that portion of the opinion. Meanwhile, I join the 
majority’s due process analysis but write separately to 
express some concerns about the practice of stash house 
reverse stings. 
 We have held, based on Mathews, that “evidence of 
mere solicitation, as a matter of law, is not germane to the 
jury’s determination of entrapment.” United States v. Marino, 
868 F.2d 549, 552 n.6 (3d Cir. 1989). In Marino, a 
Government informant asked an attorney to deal in stolen 
securities. Id. at 550. The attorney agreed and thereafter 
became an active participant, initiating communication with 
the informant and attending secretive meetings. Id. at 550–51. 
We held that the District Court “correctly refused to instruct 
the jury on entrapment” because the informant “merely 
offered [the defendant] the opportunity to commit the 
offense” and because, after receiving the offer, he “exhibited 
no reluctance.” Id. at 554.  
 Same here. As the District Court explained, the record 
lacks “even the slightest indication of reluctance . . . to 
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participate in this crime.” App. 96.1 And once Dennis joined 
the conspiracy, he contributed enthusiastically. For instance, 
he brought in two other co-conspirators (John Mitchell and 
Terrance Hardee) and helped choreograph the planned 
robbery by suggesting that the crew should tie up the guards 
in the stash house.  
 Recognizing that mere solicitation is not enough, we 
have set out a non-exhaustive list of ways that a defendant 
can demonstrate entitlement to an entrapment instruction. 
These avenues include showing “persuasion, fraudulent 
representation, coercive tactics, [or] pleas based on need, 
sympathy, or friendship.” United States v. Fedroff, 874 F.2d 
178, 185 (3d Cir. 1989). The majority rests its analysis 
primarily on the last item in the list—“pleas based on need, 
sympathy, or friendship.” It contends that “Burk’s personal 
relationship to Dennis contributed to the operation by 
allowing Burk to appeal to Dennis’ sympathies based on the 
story of Burk’s sick mother whom Dennis had met on a 
number of occasions.” Maj. Op. at 13.  
                                              
1 As the majority notes, Dennis testified that he had 
previously turned down other requests from Kevin Burk, the 
confidential informant, to commit similar crimes. The 
majority properly avoids suggesting that these incidents bear 
on inducement. Rather, it correctly contains its discussion of 
them to the predisposition prong. The stash house robbery 
was the first crime that Burk proposed to Dennis on behalf of 
the Government. Entrapment is concerned with inducement 
by the Government, not with requests made by private parties 
with their own agendas. See, e.g., United States v. 
Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 573 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that a 
“defendant who was induced to commit a crime by a private 
party, without any government involvement, cannot claim 
that he was entrapped”). 
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 Though there is a low bar for getting a jury instruction 
on entrapment, doing so based on personal relationships is 
relatively difficult. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 216 F.3d 
80, 90 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Although we have in the past 
indicated that [such pleas] can satisfy the inducement prong 
of an entrapment defense, we have never found such a plea 
sufficiently strong to do so.”). But here the problem runs 
deeper. Though Dennis testified at length, he never said that 
sympathy for Burk’s mother had anything to do with his 
decision to join the conspiracy to rob the stash house.  
 The majority acknowledges this problem. It concedes 
that it is “true that Dennis never uttered the words that 
‘friendship motivated his participation’ in the stash house 
scheme,” but it nonetheless finds “a plea of friendship to lie at 
the basis of Burk’s plea for help.” Maj. Op. at 14 n.6. My 
colleagues base this conclusion on Dennis’ testimony that he 
told Burk that the money from the robbery “is really gonna 
help your mother.” Id. (quoting App. 1138). But Dennis’ 
recognition that the money would help Burk’s mother does 
not mean that this caused him to agree to the robbery. Our 
duty to interpret the record in Dennis’ favor does not include 
an obligation (or, for that matter, a license) to put words in his 
mouth. If Dennis had said he perceived an obligation to help 
Burk’s mother, the majority would be on stronger footing. 
But he did not, and we should not proceed as though he had.  
 Apart from the sympathy theory, the majority also 
emphasizes that the ATF did not have Dennis on its radar 
prior to the sting. However, it never explains how this relates 
to inducement. As discussed below, the Government’s 
selection of targets might bear on a due process analysis. But 
the question for our purposes is not how the Government 
found Dennis, but rather the methods it employed to secure 
his willingness to commit a crime. Ultimately, the evidence 
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shows that Dennis did not take much (or even any) 
convincing.   
 None of this should suggest that entrapment 
instructions are unavailable in the context of stash house 
reverse stings. In fact, they frequently are required. For 
instance, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, determined that 
a defendant had a right to an instruction because the 
Government engaged in a “concerted effort” to get him to 
agree to rob a stash house. United States v. Mayfield, 771 
F.3d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). The defendant 
declined all of the initial offers, but the Government’s 
informant persisted by bringing up the subject “[e]ach day” 
over an extended period. Id. This is classic evidence of 
inducement.  
 But less than a month later, a panel of the Seventh 
Circuit decided another stash house reverse sting case that 
looks a lot more like ours, and it concluded that no 
entrapment instruction was required. My colleagues suggest 
that this second case, United States v. Blitch, 773 F.3d 837 
(7th Cir. 2014), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en 
banc (Jan. 27, 2015), is helpful to their approach. I disagree, 
as it is difficult to imagine a more factually similar example 
of why an entrapment instruction is not required here.  
 Let’s start with the facts of Blitch. There, as here, an 
ATF agent played the role of a disgruntled courier for a cartel 
and recruited a confidential informant to find individuals 
willing to rob a large quantity of drugs. Id. at 840. If 
anything, the informant’s incentives were more of a problem 
in Blitch than they were here. That is because the Blitch 
informant had agreed, as part of a plea, to assist in the arrest 
and indictment of a specific number of individuals (ten), and 
he was applying the stash house robbery participants toward 
that quota. Id. Like Rock did here, the agent in Blitch offered 
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the defendants a way out if they had cold feet, but (as Dennis 
did) they remained enthusiastically committed. Id. at 842. 
And, as was true here, the informant in Blitch was actively 
involved in the sting. For instance, he asked one of the 
defendants to find another participant, discussed how the 
robbers would split the haul, set up a meeting with the 
undercover agent, and called the crew the night before the 
would-be heist to provide details. Id. at 840–42.  
 The panel in Blitch contrasted its facts with those in 
Mayfield. Whereas the latter involved a drawn-out courtship 
between the Government and a reluctant participant, Blitch 
featured a “take-it-or-leave-it proposition” where the 
Government merely presented a crime without extensively 
lobbying the defendants to participate. Id. at 845. The Court 
concluded that the defendants “were not subject to anything 
that would transform the government’s solicitation into 
something more than an ordinary opportunity to commit a 
crime,” and it rejected the argument that the “promise of 
obtaining a large amount of drugs, in addition to hundreds of 
thousands of dollars of actual cash on hand, qualifies as 
improper inducement.” Id. at 844–45 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Thus, far from helping the majority, Blitch 
rejects its reasoning.  
 Because there is not sufficient evidence of inducement, 
Dennis is not entitled to a jury instruction even if he could 
establish a lack of predisposition. See Marino, 868 F.2d at 
551 n.3 (“Consequently, if the defendant does not produce 
sufficient evidence of inducement, his evidence of non-
predisposition alone would not warrant an entrapment 
charge.”). The threshold that a defendant must cross to get an 
instruction is not high, but Dennis has failed to meet his 
burden. I would therefore affirm the District Court’s ruling on 
the entrapment instruction.  
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 Dennis also raises a due process challenge. My 
determination that he was not entitled to an entrapment 
instruction does not foreclose concluding that the indictment 
should be quashed due to egregious conduct by the 
Government. See, e.g., United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 
578, 608 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc) (noting that “a finding of 
no entrapment does not preclude the availability of a due 
process defense”). As the majority notes, however, this claim 
falls short. I write nonetheless on this point to express my 
concern about the constitutional implications of stash house 
reverse stings.  
 The Government wields tremendous power in 
investigating crimes. Here it exercised that authority to create 
from whole cloth a fictitious crime and to prosecute someone 
for a robbery that could not have been committed. There was 
no stash house, no cartel, and no cocaine. This is not an 
isolated occurrence. According to a 2013 article, over 1,000 
people have been arrested (and at least 600 have been 
prosecuted) in connection with attempting to rob fictitious 
stash houses. See Brad Heath, ATF Uses Fake Drugs, Big 
Bucks to Snare Suspects, USA Today, June 28, 2013, at 1A. 
The Constitution affords great deference to the Government’s 
investigative choices, but it does draw a line: indictments 
based on outrageous conduct cannot stand. No court of 
appeals has found that the Government has crossed that line 
in setting up a stash house reverse sting. But it appears that 
the Government has been tiptoeing near the line.  
 For instance, in United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294 
(9th Cir. 2013), the Government sent an informant into “a bad 
part of town” to look for strangers willing to rob a stash 
house. Id. at 299 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
targeting was not based on any suspicion that the people 
approached were in any way predisposed to commit the 
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crime. The majority concluded that there was not a due 
process violation. Judge Noonan dissented, writing:  
[T]he imaginary stash house . . . gives the 
government essentially unchecked power to 
increase the number of persons drawn in as 
robbers by supplying the number of imaginary 
guards for the drugs and by supplying the 
amount of imaginary drugs that are supposed to 
be present. The power exercised by the 
government is not only to orchestrate the crime 
but to control and expand those guilty of it. I do 
not see how this power can be rationally 
exercised. No standard exists to determine the 
limits of the government’s discretion. 
Id. at 318 (Noonan, J., dissenting). And when the Ninth 
Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc, Judge Reinhardt, 
joined by then-Chief Judge Kozinski, dissented. They wrote 
that the majority opinion sent “a dangerous signal that courts 
will uphold law enforcement tactics even though their threat 
to values of equality, fairness, and liberty is unmistakable.” 
United States v. Black, 750 F.3d 1053, 1054 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 Black is a cautionary tale about what can result if the 
power to create crimes is employed without constraints. Our 
facts are not nearly as severe. The Government did not, as it 
did in Black, select a defendant at random. Rather, a 
confidential informant provided information about Dennis’ 
criminal past, much of which the Government was able to 
corroborate, before the sting was approved. But that does not 
make the critique wholly inapplicable. Unlike Judge Noonan, 
I do not find it impossible for the Government to exercise its 
discretion rationally to set up stash house reverse stings. But I 
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share the concern that this practice, if not properly checked, 
eventually will find itself on the wrong side of the line. 
 Until then, courts can only play a limited role in 
policing investigative priorities. We are judges and not 
policymakers, and our lodestar is outrageousness and not 
imprudence. But what we can do is distinguish our narrow 
constitutional analysis from a broad stamp of approval. As we 
explained in an analogous context, “[t]his conclusion . . . 
should not be construed as an approval of the government’s 
conduct. To the contrary, we have grave doubts about the 
propriety of such tactics. Although we cannot say that such 
conduct in and of itself violates the Constitution, it may 
illustrate the necessity for greater oversight so that 
questionable police practices can be curbed before they 
violate our most fundamental laws.” United States v. Beverly, 
723 F.2d 11, 13 (3d Cir. 1983). I echo these sentiments here.  
